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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine after all of the hard work and long hours to get a company
up and running, your workers decide to unionize and it is time for you to
begin negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement. The union
decides that they would prefer not to reach an agreement through the
traditional bargaining channels, believing instead that the workers would
receive better terms if a third party imposed the initial agreement.
Therefore, instead of following the typical protocol of using good faith
bargaining to reach an agreement, the union stalls for ninety days. At this
point, the government sends in an unaccountable third party with little
knowledge of your business needs and desires or the needs and desires of
the workers. Now both the employer and union are stuck with the terms
reached by this arbitrator for a two-year period.
Think about having the most important decisions about pay, hours,
and benefits left in the hands of an unaccountable third party and the end-
result is a collective bargaining agreement that neither involved party
wants! These are the consequences of the impending passage of section (3)
of the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA). The Employee Free Choice
Act has been gaining steam as it moves through the legislative process, and
if the employees and employers of America do not make themselves heard
soon, it could be too late. The passage of this act would be the first time
that Congress updated and amended the NLRA in over a half century.'
When looking closely at the interest arbitration provision in section (3) of
the EFCA, it becomes clear that this provision takes away the freedom to
contract, an underlying principal in the economy. Instead, the statute favors
a "more-efficient" system that forces the choice upon the employees and
Juris Doctor, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2011.
'Employee Free Choice Act of 2009 (EFCA), H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010).
2 James Sherk & Paul Kersey, How the Employee Free Choice Act Takes Away
Worker's Rights, ExEcuTwVE SuMMARY BACKGROUNDER 13 (Feb. 27, 2009).
3 J. Kevin Hennessy et al., Recent Developments in Labor-Management Relations,
802 PLI/Lit 377, 379 (2009) (other major federal statutes, like the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Civil Rights Acts, are updated more frequently).
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employers. Should we allow an unaccountable third party with limited
knowledge of the business and workers' demands to make the ultimate
decision? Before deciding, this paper will examine the act itself and the
common problems that could arise under it.
II. OVERVIEW OF SECTION THREE OF THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE
ACT: FACILITATING INITIAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) is a hot button issue today.
With all of the political parties pushing and pulling in different directions in
an attempt to get their point across, much of the focus is on the card check
provisions of the EFCA. These provisions would do away with the
traditional "secret ballot" system in place for union representation elections.
With this being such a serious issue with very serious implications on rights
to privacy, coercion, etc., the other provisions of the EFCA are often
brushed over and not given the full and proper attention they deserve.
While it is true that the card check provisions are the start of it all, because
without unionization, there will be no collective bargaining, it is important
for the country to be aware of the serious concerns that section (3) of the
EFCA brings about.
In fact, it is quite possible that the finalized version of the EFCA, if
signed into law, will not even have the card check provision at all, but will
retain the compulsory arbitration clause.4 Senator Arlen Specter has
recently said that he believes the bill will get the requisite sixty votes after
some negotiating has led to a change in the card check provision of the
EFCA, but that the proposed bill will retain the compulsory arbitration
provision without any material changes at all.'
If passed, section (3) of the currently proposed EFCA would amend
section eight of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by adding a number
of provisions to the end of the current act.6 The EFCA would add subsection (h)
4 James A. Burns, Jr., "EFCA Lite": Revised Version ofEmployee Free Choice Act
Moves Forward, EMP. LAW WATCH, Sept. 17, 2009,
http://www.employmentlawwatch.com/articles/employment-us/labor-relations/.
5 id.
Any revised version of EFCA would not include the widely
attacked "card check" provision found in the current version of
EFCA... The bill would retain the binding interest arbitration
found in the current version of EFCA, so that if an employer and
union failed to reach agreement on a first contract within so
many days following the election, federal arbitrators could step in
and impose an agreement on the parties dictating employees'
wages, benefits, hours, layoff procedures, and so on.
Id
6 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006).
2010 The Employee Free Choice Act: The Effect of 179
Compulsory Interest Arbitration on Entrepreneurs
to the act, modifying current subsection (d) when collective bargaining is used
to establish an initial agreement following certification or recognition. In these
circumstances, which are particularly likely to arise in the context of
entrepreneurial ventures, the act would take control of the collective bargaining
process. Under the current system, negotiations on an initial contract with a
newly formed union receive the same treatment as any other collective
bargaining. Both parties negotiate, with a good faith duty, until they reach
amenable terms. If they do not agree on a contract, then either party is free to
use self-help measures to facilitate an agreement, by either implementing an
employee strike, an employer lockout, or a last chance offer. Currently, sixty-
eight percent of newly formed unions enter into a first contract with the
employer within one year of recognition of the union.9 This leaves less than one
third, thirty two percent, without a contract in place after one year. This, of
course, could force employers and employees to turn to a number of means of
economic self-help under the current system: lockouts, strikes, slowdowns, etc.
Section (3) is the most troubling provision in the act. By providing
for arbitration upon request of one of the parties after a mere thirty day
period, not long when compared to typical negotiations periods, the statute
removes the long standing and traditional method for negotiating first
agreements between companies and unions. This new method would
'H.R. 1409.
Id. The EFCA § 3 states:
(2) If after the expiration of the 90-day period beginning on the
date on which bargaining is commenced, or such additional period
as the parties may agree upon, the parties have failed to reach an
agreement, either party may notify the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service of the existence of a dispute and request
mediation. Whenever such a request is received, it shall be the
duty of the Service promptly to put itself in communication with
the parties and to use its best efforts, by mediation and
conciliation, to bring them to agreement.
(3) If after the expiration of the 30-day period beginning on the
date on which the request for mediation is made under paragraph
(2), or such additional period as the parties may agree upon, the
Service is not able to bring the parties to agreement by
conciliation, the Service shall refer the dispute to an arbitration
board established in accordance with such regulations as may be
prescribed by the Service. The arbitration panel shall render a
decision settling the dispute and such decision shall be binding
upon the parties for a period of 2 years, unless amended during
such period by written consent of the parties.
Id.
9 David Broderdorf, Overcoming the First Contract Hurdle: Finding a Role for
Mandatory Interest Arbitration in the Private Sector, 23 LAB. LAW. 323, 331
(2008).
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forcefully impose initial agreements upon both parties. The arbitrations
would be handled by a panel appointed by a government agency, the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) who is not an
interested party in the fairness of the agreement, but rather in the efficiency
of the process and its effects on the labor force of the country as a whole.'o
Additionally, section (3) mandates that the arbitration panel's decision bind
both parties for a period of two years, unless both parties agree to amend
the decision in writing. This provision goes against the freedom to contract
and detracts from the effectiveness of labor negotiations that are a backbone
of the American economy.
Another troubling aspect of the proposed EFCA is that the bill does
not specify the procedure for selecting the arbitration panel, how big the
panel will be, or what criteria they should focus on. The only indication is
that the FMCS will have control over the process." This is extremely
troubling because it leaves the process in the hands of the administrator of
the FMCS, an appointed position. This allows the interest arbitration
process to become partisan and could have disastrous results.
The EFCA is oft debated and popular today, in part because the
government has been struggling to find a way to preserve the union while
decreasing the occurrence of work stoppages (be it strikes or lock-outs) that
put a strain on the economy and cause loss. This act aims to prevent
lockouts and strikes during the initial bargaining by providing an alternative
route to reach a binding agreement through arbitration and then hoping that
after reaching the initial agreement, the parties will be able to extend these
agreements without resorting to measures of economic self-help. While
this looks good in theory, it comes at a cost. It is counter to the traditional
views of our capitalistic society and the freedom to contract.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE SYSTEM: EXAMPLES
Often times it is difficult to understand how a system will function
without seeing it in place. Fortunately, for the labor industry, we have the
advantage of being able to look at a number of examples, in both the private
and public sectors, of legislative compulsory arbitration provisions in use.
By examining a few case studies, the glaring deficiencies in the systems
come to the forefront, saving the nation as a whole from having to use a
"trial and error" method with so many careers and businesses at stake.
Below, a number of examples will be examined and compared to the
binding arbitration proposed in section (3). Interest arbitration is much
1o See F. Vincent Vemuccio, A Primer on the Employee Free Choice Act's
Arbitration Provision, 157 COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. 1 (2009).
" Richard A. Epstein, The Case Against the Employee Free Choice Act 55 (Univ.
of Chi. John M. Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 452, 2009), available
at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id= 1337185.
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more common in the public sector, where the employees' right to resort to
economic self-help, like striking, is limited or non-existent. Some states,
however, have attempted to use interest arbitration in the private sector as
well.
A. Public Sector Examples
A number of states already have interest arbitration in place
through their public employee labor relations acts.12 Using public sector
examples is important in this discussion because they are the most common
example of interest arbitration in action. While many public sector
employees have forfeited their right to strike in most of these statutes, due
to the potential societal costs of striking, they still have the ability to
negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement that would benefit both
parties.13 Additionally, the public sector issues parallel private sector issues
in a number of ways, from the efficiency concerns to the accountability and
impartiality of the arbitrators. These examples of the Michigan act
applying to public safety workers and the provision specifically applying to
police and firefighters will illustrate how the interest arbitration system can
affect these issues. Massachusetts also dabbled in the interest arbitration
for the public sector and after a mere two years of watching its
ineffectiveness; the voters approved a ballot initiative that scrapped the
provision. 14
1. Michigan Public Safety Workers
A system of compulsory binding arbitration is already in place in
Michigan for public safety workers.' 5 The language in the EFCA is parallel
to the language of the Michigan act in a number of ways.' 6 The Act in
Michigan supposedly makes arbitration move smoothly and quickly, with
the statutory language providing that the parties reach an agreement within
12 David B. Lipsky & Harry C. Katz, Alternative Approaches to Interest
Arbitration: Lessons from New York City, PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT., Winter 2006,
http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/1 60542398.html.
13 See generally MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.236 (West 2010).
14 Peter List, EFCA's Binding Arbitration: Putting Workers on the Path to Serfdom,
MFG CRUNCH, July 13, 2009, http://mfgcrunch.ning.com/profiles/blogs/efcas-
binding-arbitration.
15 Sherk & Kersey, supra note 2, at 13.
16 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.236 (West 2010); H.R. 1409. Both statutes give
parties a set time to reach an agreement through collective bargaining, next they are
referred to binding arbitration if the two parties are at an impasse. However, the
EFCA does not require the employees to forfeit their right to strike, while the
Michigan law does.
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eight weeks from the initial commencement of the proceedings.' 7 In reality,
however, binding arbitration for Michigan public safety workers takes an
average of almost fifteen months, with only twenty-five percent being
resolved within three hundred days.'
Additionally, there are a number of problems with the procedural
aspects of the Michigan system of interest arbitration for public safety
workers. The most serious procedural problem relates to the selection of
the arbitration panel. Because this panel will be able to force a binding
contract upon both parties for an extended time, it is important that they be
not only intelligent and experienced, but impartial as well. Under the
current law, the union and the employer each appoint a member to the
panel, while a third member, the chairperson of the panel, comes from a
state-provided list.'9 The union and the employer select a member from this
list by alternating turns, striking names off the list until only one remains.20
This third member plays a crucial role, because the opposing parties select
the other two members, and these members generally represent their
respective parties' interests at the meetings. This process for selecting the
arbitration panel is typical among states with interest arbitration
21provisions.
Furthermore, in action, the Michigan system of compulsory
arbitration has sent a number of Michigan cities, including Highland Park
and Hamtramck, into bankruptcy.22 "In 1999, an arbitration panel awarded
Hamtramck police officers $2.1 million in pay raises and back pay, pushing
7 MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.236.
Upon the appointment of the arbitrator, he shall proceed to act as
chairman of the panel of arbitration, call a hearing, to begin
within 15 days and give reasonable notice of the time and place
of the hearing.. .The hearing conducted by the arbitration panel
may be adjourned from time to time, but, unless otherwise agreed
by the parties, shall be concluded within 30 days of the time of its
commencement. Its majority actions and rulings shall constitute
the actions and rulings of the arbitration panel.
Id.
1 Sherk & Kersey, supra note 2, at 13 (citing Mackinac Center analysis of
arbitration rulings). These rulings are available at the Michigan State University
Labor and Industrial Relations Library. COLLECTION OF FACT FINDING REP. &
ARBITRATION AWARDS 312 (1969), available at http://turf.lib.msu.edu/awards.
'9 Paul Kersey, The Arbitration Gamble (Mackinac Ctr. for Pub. Policy, Card
Check, Binding Arbitration and Employee Free Choice, No. 3 of 6, 2007),
available at http://www.mackinac.org/8326.20 id.
21 id
22 Shikha Dalmia, Checking Workers, Binding Employers: Union Bosses will be the
Only Winners Under the Employee Free Choice Act, REASON FOUND, July 14,
2009, http://reason.org/news/show/the-employee-free-choice-act-a.
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it into state receivership. Under receivership, which is only used in extreme
situations, the state government takes over the city's finances and appoints
its own manager to run the city."23 In Hamtramck's case, this combination
of service cuts and tax hikes led to an exodus of its residents.24 Some recent
studies have estimated that removing binding arbitration from this act could
result in a three percent to five percent reduction in local government
expenditures compared to non-arbitration states.2 5 This decrease in budget
expenditures on public safet% could save over one billion dollars per year
statewide in Michigan alone.
This type of danger could multiply exponentially if the EFCA
becomes law and forces private businesses to use compulsory interest
arbitration. This could raise the unemployment rate and cause a number of
companies to go out of business or declare bankruptcy because they may
have unaffordable expenses forced upon them by an unaccountable third
party arbitrator. Even more importantly, the compulsory arbitration
provision of section (3) will infringe upon the core American values of
capitalism and a free market economy.
Unlike a local government, a business cannot raise taxes or turn to
a higher level of government for financial assistance if an arbitrator's
decision favors the employees, in turn harming the company's bottom line.
Competition in the free market means that if an arbitrator miscalculates and
raises wages too high, a company cannot raise its prices to compensate for
the decision without the risk of losing customers. An ill-advised arbitrator's
ruling can easily lead to financial difficulty and layoffs. Yet arbitrators face
no penalty if a miscalculation sends a company into bankruptcy or cheats
workers out of a wage increase they would have earned. Unlike binding
arbitration, with collective bargaining, both sides have a stake in making
the final agreement work.
23 id
24 d
25 id
26 d
27 Sherk & Kersey, supra note 2, at 13.
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2. Detroit Police Scenario2 8
Another example that stems from the Michigan law discussed
above involved the Detroit Police Department. Binding arbitration cost
police in Detroit their cost-of-living allowance, threw the city budget out of
balance and forced the police department to lay off twenty-five percent of
the employees. 29 Because there is no appellate process in place, this result
had no effect on the arbitrator who imposed the agreement upon the parties.
The compulsory interest arbitration used in Detroit in the late 1970s
provides a concrete example of interest arbitration gone wrong, and
exemplifies the long lasting negative effects it can cause. By the late
1970s, the city of Detroit had seen a renaissance of the city's downtown
area.30 Crime rates dropped as much as nineteen percent in 1977 alone.
The city had a balanced budget but little room for discretionary spending,
as the finances were very tight.32 Then mayor, Coleman Young, was able
to reach contracts with the great majority of public city employees through
collective bargaining, but was unable to reach an agreement with the police
and fire unions.33 The bargaining with the police union came to an impasse,
and the city and the union were forced into interest arbitration under Public
Act 312. The arbitrator levied his decision soon after the process began,
siding with the police union by increasing pay and other benefits.3 ' This
decision forced the city to pay forty-six million dollars in cost-of-living
adjustments; in turn putting the city's spending way over budget.6
Unfortunately, the city was unable to afford this and stay within the
budget, so it responded by "removing 350 officers and cutting 2,300
employees from other departments." Because there is no procedure in
28 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.321 (West 2010).
Sec. 1. It is the public policy of this state that in public police and
fire departments, where the right of employees to strike is by law
prohibited, it is requisite to the high morale of such employees
and the efficient operation of such departments to afford an
alternate, expeditious, effective and binding procedure for the
resolution of disputes, and to that end the provisions of this act,
providing for compulsory arbitration, shall be liberally construed.
Id. This provision specifically extends the mandatory arbitration provision from
the Michigan law to police and firefighters.
29 Sherk & Kersey, supra note 2, at 14.
30 Kersey, supra note 19.
3 Id.
32 Id.
33id.
34 d
35 id
36 Dalmia, supra note 22.
3 Kersey, supra note 19.
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place that requires courts to accept appeals and intervene in this type of
situation, the mayor turned to even more layoffs, eventually dropping the
force from 5,400 officers to only 4,000 for the entire city of Detroit, a drop
of over twenty-five percent of the force.38 Because of the layoffs and the
lessened presence of police in Detroit, the crime rates began to reverse
course once again, skyrocketing to an increase of over 15% in 1980.39
Sensing how much the arbitration decision was hurting the city of Detroit,
as well as the individual police officers, the union agreed to a three-year
wage freeze in 1981.40
The statistics cited above show precisely how detrimental an
impact forced interest arbitration can have. In Detroit, the arbitration
decision left the city of Detroit, the mayor, the police department, and the
police officers in a worse position than they had been in prior to the forced
arbitration. A substantial portion of the police force lost their jobs, the rest
of the police department had to work longer hours with less assistance, and
crime rates began a steady climb. In the aftermath of this disaster, former
Mayor Young, an original drafter of the statute as a state senator, summed
up the state's experiment with interest arbitration best.4 1 In 1981, he told
the National Journal, "We now know that compulsory arbitration has been
a failure... Slowly, inexorably, compulsory interest arbitration has destroyed
sensible fiscal management and has caused more damage to the public
service than the strikes it was designed to prevent.A 2  The people of
Michigan showed that they agreed with the mayor in 2002 when they voted
down the union sponsored ballot initiative to extend compulsory arbitration
to all state employees, not just public safety workers.43 Both liberal and
conservative media outlets supported the defeat of this initiative." This is
one example of a disastrous result stemming from interest arbitration, and it
is likely to be even worse in the private sector if the EFCA passes because
the private employers and employees do not have the same assistance from
the government and public backing that public safety workers have.
Businesses, unlike government taxpayer funded police departments,
may not be able to overcome such a disastrous scenario and may need to
close down, forcing all of the employees to lose their jobs. The situation in
Detroit is a prime example of the ineffectiveness of the compulsory binding
interest arbitration system. It left both parties in a worse position than they
were in when they entered negotiations; there was no one to hold
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 d
41 Dalmia, supra note 22.
42 Id.
43 id
4 Id.
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accountable for the deficiencies of the process, and it harmed all parties
involved, including the public, who now has to entrust their safety and well-
being to a smaller, poorly funded police department.
B. Private Sector Examples
Recently, the private sector has used interest arbitration in limited
circumstances as well, though it is usually not accompanied by a ban on
striking as is customary in the public sector. Looking at these examples and
the problems they have caused is beneficial when studying the effectiveness
and potential problems of section (3) of the EFCA. This is helpful because
they are very similar in a number of ways; mainly that both will apply to
private sector workers, an area traditionally left to the businesses and
employees themselves. The cases below provide examples of what
problems the EFCA section (3) could cause, but by no means are the EFCA
problems limited to the discussion below. The fact that the EFCA section
(3) will apply to all employees rather than a select few (railway, airline, and
agricultural workers in the case studies) will illustrate how much more
problematic these efficiency and resource problems will be under the
EFCA, when the number of people using the interest arbitration will be
exponentially greater.
1. Illinois Public Labor Relations Act - Public Act 96-05984
On August 18, 2009, Governor Pat Quinn of Illinois signed Public
Law 96-0598 into effect as an amendment to the Illinois Public Labor
Relations Act (IPLRA)." The new law now requires bargaining units with
45 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/315 (West 2010). Relevant language reads:
(3) If after the expiration of the 30-day period beginning on the
date on which mediation commenced, or such additional period as
the parties may agree upon, the mediator is not able to bring the
parties to agreement by conciliation, either the exclusive
representative of the employees or the employer may request of the
other, in writing, arbitration and shall submit a copy of the request
to the board. Upon submission of the request for arbitration, the
parties shall be required to participate in the impasse arbitration
procedures set forth in Section 14 of this Act, except the right to
strike shall not be considered waived pursuant to Section 17 of this
Act, until the actual convening of the arbitration hearing.
Id.
46 Seyfarth Shaw LLP, First Contract Interest Arbitration Now Applies to Illinois
Non-Public Safety Employees, MGMT. ALERT (2009),
http://www.seyfarth.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.publications-detaillobj
ect id/b6ba74d0-5efc-4504-b 1 df-
b7853fa79ef4/FirstContractInterestArbitrationNowAppliesTolllinoisNon-
PublicSafetyEmployees.cfm.
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less than thirty-five non-public safety employees to use interest arbitration
as a way to resolve first contract labor disputes.4 7 The law, which went into
effect on January 1, 2010, allows either party to submit a request for
binding arbitration after thirty days of collective bargaining has failed to
produce an agreement.48 At this point, the procedure outlined above under
Section fourteen of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act will govern the
arbitration process with one major exception.4 9 Unlike under the IPLRA
(where there is no right to strike for the public employees), here the "union
will enjoy the best of both worlds" by retaining their ability to strike until
the "actual convening" of the interest arbitration proceedings.o
Because this Act just recently went into effect, there have been no
instances of the law forcing interest arbitration on non-public employees.
However, there has been a large amount of protest and uprise in the
community about the new law because it takes the freedom to contract
away from the businesses and employees. Under the proposed law, the
employees have the upper hand because they retain their right to strike in
addition to being able to force interest arbitration.5' This is similar to
section (3) of the EFCA because it applies to private employers and
employees, and they retain the right to strike or use other economic self-
help measures in spite of the new found right to force arbitration.
2. California Africultural Labor Relations Act - 2002
Amendments
47 id
48 d
49 Id. at 2.
50 Id.
5' Id.
52 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1164 (West 2010).
The important provisions of the California ALRA are as follows:
(a) An agricultural employer or a labor organization certified as the
exclusive bargaining agent of a bargaining unit of agricultural
employees may file with the board, at any time following (1) 90
days after a renewed demand to bargain by an agricultural
employer or a labor organization certified prior to January 1, 2003,
which meets the conditions specified in Section 1164.11 or (2) 180
days after an initial request to bargain by an agricultural employer
or a labor organization certified after January 1, 2003, a declaration
that the parties have failed to reach a collective bargaining
agreement and a request that the board issue an order directing the
parties to mandatory mediation and conciliation of their issues.
"Agricultural employer," for purposes of this chapter, means an
agricultural employer, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section
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The California Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA) is another
example of compulsory arbitrations3 in the private sector. Because the
NLRA excluded farm workers, the California Legislature created a similar
statute to apply to their many agricultural workers in 1975.54 The ALRA
was similar to the NLRA, but it included a so-called "make whole"
provision to overcome the problems associated with bad-faith bargaining
efforts seen in other private sector collective bargaining situations under the
NLRA.s Under the NLRA, the board cannot award lost wages to
employees because of failure to bargain in good faith. 6 The only remedy
available under the NLRA is to issue a Gissel Bargaining Order." Clearly,
this is not an effective remedy because it imposes no punishment on the
businesses for continuing to bargain without good faith and fails to deter
other companies from similar bargaining techniques in the future.
The make-whole provision allowed affected workers to recover by
transferring any monetary savings the employer earned by using bad-faith
collective bargaining techniques.s Unfortunately, this solution was not too
effective in action and often caused more trouble than it prevented, by
producing "years of litigation."59
Due to the void in protection left by the ineffective make-whole
provision, the California Legislature amended the ALRA in 2002 after
1140.4, who has employed or engaged 25 or more agricultural
employees during any calendar week in the year preceding the
filing of a declaration pursuant to this subdivision.
Id.
s3 The act uses the word mediation rather than arbitration, however the practical
effect is the same.
54 Jordon T.L. Halgas, Reach an Agreement or Else: Mandatory Arbitration Under
the California Agriculture Labor Relations Act, 14 S.J. AGRIC. L. REv. 1, 10
(2004). The theory commonly proposed by the laborers is that the NLRA did not
apply to farm workers partially because at the time of the passage of the NLRA in
1937, "farms were primarily family and household enterprises." Because they were
not traditional businesses, Congress felt that they did not need to have the NLRA
apply to them. A contrasting theory thinks that the exemption was a political ploy
used to get the bill to pass with less opposition.
5 Philip Martin & Bert Mason, Mandatory Mediation Changes Rules for
Negotiating Farm Labor Contracts, 57 CAL. AGRIC. 1, 13-14 (2003), available at
http://califomiaagriculture.ucanr.org.
56 Halgas, supra note 54, at 16.
s7 Id. A "Gissel Bargaining Order" is an order requiring the employer to bargain
with the union; the Board will issue such an order only in "exceptional cases"
evidenced by outrageous, pervasive unfair labor practices and when there was a
showing of union majority support. Nat'l Labor Rel. Bd. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395
U.S. 575, 610 (1969).
58 Halgas, supra note 54, at 15.
59 Id.
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much pressure from the United Farm Workers union.60  The new
amendments provide that after one hundred and eighty days have passed
after the newly formed agricultural union and the employer began initial
collective bargaining, either party can request that the board issue an order
mandating mediation.6' This mediator in charge then considers the
62
negotiations and can hand down a binding decision on both parties.
The problems with the ALRA's compulsory arbitration are the
same that will come from passage of the EFCA. The binding arbitration is
"anti-business," the positions that were once private in negotiations
between the parties may become public, and finally, a lack of data
handicaps the unaccountable mediator or arbitrator. In other words, the
mediators and arbitrators are not in any position to make a decision that will
bind both of the parties. They do not have enough information about the
business finances or the employee habits and work life to make the proper
decision by considering all relevant information.
The arbitrators tend to make their decisions by using wage rates
and benefits commonly found in "comparable" businesses. However,
different agricultural businesses have different needs and methods of
cultivation, thus the work demand and conditions vary from farm to farm.
By borrowing from comparable competitors, the arbitration provision
begins to "standardize" the agreements. This takes away the ability of
companies to recruit top-level workers by offering them better deals and it
eliminates the ability to use progressive and creative business techniques
because the standard contract will force businesses to follow the standard
business model or face the possibility of bankruptcy. This is why the
traditional form of collective bargaining is best; it lets both parties air out
their issues and make compromises to ensure that they receive what is
important to them.
C. Wrap- Up of Examples
The above examples paint a clear picture of how far from perfect
compulsory interest arbitration is in practice. In theory, interest arbitration
may sound like a good system. However, in action, the places that have
enacted compulsory arbitration for public workers did not get what they
bargained for. The examples provided above give us details and concrete
examples of how slow the process is, often taking much longer than a
60 Martin & Mason, supra note 55.
61 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1164 (West 2010).
62 id
63 Halgas, supra note 54, at 16.
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normal collective bargaining process." One thing that the first set of
examples has in common, however, is that they only apply to public
employees. Over twenty states have some form of compulsory arbitration
system in place for public employees of certain sectors. The EFCA intends
to expand this to all employees. If the system was so slow and backlogged
when only public sector employees were governed by it, it is hard to
imagine how much longer the process will take when the resources are
spread even thinner and nearly all unionized workers in the U.S. are
required to comply with the Act. Most of the acts mentioned above have
provisions that prohibit workers from striking if they use the compulsory
arbitration process. The EFCA, however, does not include any sort of
provision requiring a prohibition against striking in exchange for
compulsory mediation or arbitration.
The private sector examples used are limited, because the
government generally tends not to intrude on private sector business
contracting. The EFCA will change this, and the government will have the
opportunity to create binding two-year labor contracts in a large number of
situations. These arbitrator-imposed labor contracts will affect the
businesses, especially small businesses, in a number of ways. First, the
decisions will provide for back pay from the time the negotiations started.
This means that the award applies retroactively and the companies need to
spend the duration of negotiations, sometimes fifteen months or longer,
preparing their business to be able to absorb the possible losses that the new
wage increases will levy upon them, including back pay for the time of
negotiations. Therefore, companies in labor negotiations cannot afford to
use aggressive business strategies because they are uncertain where the
government will force them to spend their funds after arbitration. An
aggressive strategy upfront could leave these small businesses bankrupt
after the arbitrator hands down their decision. On the contrary, workers
have a similar predicament. They are unable to plan their spending and
budget their money because they are often working for an undetermined
67
wage during negotiations.
Additionally, the language of the EFCA prevents the workers from
getting rid of the union after certification due to a number of bars put in
6 Broderdorf, supra note 9. The amount of time the normal process takes can vary
due to a variety of circumstances. On average, sixty-eight percent of unions reach
an agreement on their first contract with an employer within one year.
65 J. Kevin Hennessy, Vedder Price P.C., & Carrie A. Herschman, Recent
Developments in Labor-Management Relations, 802 PLI/Lit 377, 380 (2009).
6 PAUL KERSEY, CARD CHECK, BINDING ARBITRATION AND EMPLOYEE FREE
CHOICE, MACKINAC CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY (2007), available at
http://www.mackinac.org/8327.67 id.
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place by the language of the statute and prior NLRB decisions.68  The
certification bar presents the first hurdle.69 The certification bar requires
workers to wait a full year after certification before they can vote to remove
the union.o This year grace period gives the union the opportunity to
negotiate its first contract. It also acts to make sure the union is still in
place when the interest arbitration provision of section (3) kicks in.
Because the union cannot be removed during or for a number of years after
the arbitration concludes, this gives the unions yet another incentive to
request interest arbitration if negotiations seem to be going slow and may
take more than one year.
The second obstacle that prevents removal of the union is the
contract bar. Once the union agrees to a collective bargaining agreement or
the arbitrator imposes one, the workers cannot vote to decertify that union
for a period of up to three years, and certainly not before the contract
expires after its two-year period.7 ' A recent report from the Mackinac
Center explains the problems that binding arbitration presents in the
decertification process by saying,
With binding arbitration in place, these rights are likely to
be gone or rendered moot. EFCA does not provide for
workers to terminate the arbitration process. No matter how
long arbitration drags on the workers will remain stuck
with it, even if it goes on for longer than a year - which is
typical in Michigan. Once an arbitrator is called in, his or
her word will be final, so a vote to reject the contract is out
of the question.72
This provides an example of how dangerous section (3) of the EFCA could
be to workers as well as employers. Before they know it, the workers could
be locked into a contract for at least two years and may have to pay union
dues to a union they do not support for up to three years.
Overall, the examples above, both of private sector and public
sector interest arbitration, show a trend of problems with the process. In
Michigan, the public voted against extending the policy to all public service
employees.7 3 In Massachusetts, the public voted against interest arbitration
for the public sector in general, striking down the interest arbitration statute
a mere two years after it went into effect.7 4 One would hope that the
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 id.
71 Id.
72 id
73 id
74 id.
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Detroit police scenario is not a common occurrence under the EFCA; it is
meant to provide an example of the possible dangers of interest arbitration
and the effects that it can have. However, all of the examples show a lack
of efficiency, deriving interest arbitration of its strongest selling point.
IV. COUNTERING THE PROPONENTS CLAIMS
A. Claim One: The Public Sector and Other Countries have had
Positive Experiences with Interest Arbitration
Over twenty states, as well as the District of Columbia, currently
have some form of interest arbitration for public sector employees."
Almost every single one of these statutes in place prevents the workers
from striking. Taking away the right to strike for private sector employers
would most likely be an unconstitutional intrusion on their individual
rights, and the EFCA does not propose to do so. For this reason, one should
be careful when comparing public sector and foreign interest arbitration
statutes with the EFCA section (3) provisions. In the preceding section of
this paper, public sector examples illustrated the opposite of what the
proponents claim; the interest arbitration statutes are not working. These
examples prove that interest arbitration can go horribly wrong with a no-
strike provision. Without such a provision, the detriment can be
exponentially greater because the unions will yield all of the power. If they
are not happy with the mediation process prior to the binding arbitration,
they can just strike, leaving the employer with little recourse.
Proponents of EFCA section (3) may also try to use evidence of
interest arbitration in Canada, New Zealand, and Australia as an example of
its effectiveness. All three of these countries, and any other country that
uses interest arbitration, cannot easily be compared to the United States
because they do not have the same constitutions in place as the United
States. Over eighty percent of the Canadian workforce and residents of
eight of the eleven jurisdictions are covered by first contract mediation and
arbitration. The American Rights at Work report claims that the EFCA
will be effective, and claims, "there is no evidence that overall Canadian
experience with the process has been detrimental to the employers or
7 David B. Lipsky & Harry C. Katz, Alternative Approaches to Interest
Arbitration: Lessons from New York City, ENTREPRENEUR (2006).
Estimates used in sources range from twenty states, on the low end, to thirty states
on the high end. Due to the turnover and change associated with this type of
statute, as well as the variations on the arbitration that control whether it is truly
mandatory, it is hard to quote an accurate number.
7 6 SusAN JOHNSON, FIRST CONTRACT ARBITRATION: EFFECTS ON BARGAINING AND
WORK STOPPAGES (2008), available at
http://www.Icerpa.org/papers/LCERPA_2009-01.pdf.
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employees."77 This over-generalized statement provides no assurance to
the American private sector work force. This statement relies on the fact
that parties rarely utilize these provisions to impose first contracts.78 The
EFCA section (3); however, will do exactly the opposite, as it will impose a
number of first contracts on parties. The short timeframe of ninety days,
during which the parties may negotiate without government interference, is
almost certain to expire before the sides reach an agreement, and then the
interest arbitration process will begin, leading to the imposition of first
contracts between employers and newly formed unions.
B. Claim Two: The Statute will not Affect Small Businesses and
Entrepreneurs
Another issue, of special importance in this paper, is the impact that
interest arbitration in the private sector under the EFCA will have on small
businesses and entrepreneurs. Small business owners are entrepreneurs
who often use innovative business techniques to keep up with the big box
stores and other competitors. These techniques can involve creative use of
staff or creative payment and benefits packages. Proponents of the EFCA
claim that the act will not affect small businesses and entrepreneurs of small
startup companies because the EFCA, as proposed, will not apply to
businesses that are traditionally exempt under the current NLRA. This
means that the EFCA will not bind retail employers with sales under
$500,000 annually and non-retail employers with under $50,000 in annual
sales. 79 Their employees will not have rights under the EFCA and there
will be no compulsory interest arbitration.so
The problem is that the monetary limits the NLRA sets do not
adjust with inflation or market conditions, and therefore set a very low
threshold. In fact, congress has not adjusted the amounts for inflation in
over a half century, since 1959.8' The EFCA contains no exemption for
small businesses, so the NLRA standard will govern because the EFCA is a
part of the larger NLRA. A study conducted by the Heritage Foundation
helps to put this in perspective,
77AMERICAN RIGHTS AT WORK, THE FACTS BEHIND THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE
ACT, 8, available at http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/
ARAWReports/arawthefactsbehindefca sh.pdf.
78 Id.
79 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS: INFORMATION ON
THE NUMBER OF WORKS WITH AND WITHOUT BARGAINING RIGHTS (2002); see
also NAT'L LABOR REL. BD., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CASEHANDLING MANUAL, PART 1: UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS (2008).80 d
81 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151, 164 (1935).
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To put those figures in perspective, the average private-
sector worker costs his or her employer $56,000 a year in
wages and benefits - before the cost of any capital needed
to do the job. A business with one worker earning the
average pay would not qualify. Consequently, the law has
no meaningful small business exemption.8 2
This also means that a small business specializing in retail would not be
able to have ten full time employees making the average private sector
salary, and this is not even including the sales revenue from the retail
products. Therefore, a retail business could not make any sales at all if they
had nine or ten full time employees. This completely defeats the purpose of
going into the retail business. The only small businesses that would not be
covered would be some sole proprietorships and other businesses, such as a
retail business with very few employees and a low level of sales. This
system, as designed by the NLRA, is set up to hurt successful small
businesses, as they would be subject to the NLRA and EFCA rules.
This minimal threshold means that the EFCA would affect
4,180,000 small businesses and over 38,934,000 of their workers.
Without an amendment to update the thresholds, the EFCA will cover
nearly all businesses, meaning that the passage of the statute will affect
almost all entrepreneurs. The EFCA will affect small business owners in a
greater way than it affects larger corporations because often times they do
not have the resources to cover wage increases put in place by the
unaccountable arbitrator and absorb related losses.8 This can cause the
company to go out of business, hurting both the entrepreneur and the
employees, who no longer have jobs. The small businesses also have the
risk of being put out of business by the arbitrator's decision because the
awards allow for back pay for work done during the negotiation and
82 James Sherk, EFCA Authorizes Government Control of 4 Million Small
Businesses, HERITAGE, Mar. 12, 2009,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Labor/wm2341.cfm. The Heritage Foundation
based their calculations on data from the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor
Statistics. The typical private sector worker earns $27.02 an hour in wages and
benefits as of the third quarter of 2008. This equals $56,306 for 2080 hours of
work in one year.
83 Id. The Heritage Foundation calculations are based on data from the Department
of Commerce. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/susb02.htm (last
visited Mar. 11, 2009). The figure is the number of firms and employees at
businesses with gross receipts of between $100,000 and $10 million a year in the
non-retail sector and between $500,000 and $10 million a year in the retail sector
and excluding industries not subject to the NLRA. Those industries are agriculture,
railway, and airlines. Workers in the management of companies and enterprises
sector were also excluded because supervisors are not subject to the NLRA.
8 Id.
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arbitration period. The arbitrator can take the businesses' ability to pay into
consideration but the EFCA does not state that they have to."
The vast amount of control the government will have over the day-
to-day operations of small businesses is yet another cause for great concern.
The arbitrator will have the authority to hand down their own version of a
labor contract, which will be binding on both parties for two years.86 Labor
contracts do more than set wages and benefits for employees; they often
control employment levels, retirement and health care plans, business
operations, promotion schedules, work assignment, subcontract, and
closure, sale, or mergers. Because the contracts will bind the parties for
two years from the date of the initial contact, the entrepreneur may never be
able to implement his or her business strategy. Instead, they must
"manage" the arbitrator's business operations policy. This is a critical time
in the formation of a new business and it is very rare that a business that
struggles to get off the ground during its first few years survives and
continues to operate. For these reasons, the EFCA will have a devastating
and insurmountable effect on entrepreneurs and small businesses.
C. Claim Three: The EFCA is Different from Prior Attempts to
Force Contracts on Parties and Would Not Violate the
Constitution or go Against Supreme Court Precedent
In H.K Porter, the Supreme Court held that the NLRB did not have
power under the NLRA to compel employers or employees to agree to any
substantive contractual provision of a collective bargaining agreement.
Prior to that ruling, in 1937, the Court also noted in dicta of the NLRB v.
Laughlin Steel decision that if the NLRA had included binding arbitration
provisions, then it likely would have been an unconstitutional infringement
on the right to contract.8 Nothing has changed in the past seventy years
that makes this dictum any less important. Section (3) of the EFCA will
likely be an unconstitutional infringement on the right to contract. The
proponents of the act claim that this is not so because Congress already has
power to use binding arbitration for private disputes that affect the national
interest and also because the Congressional Research Service said that
"judicial challenges to this legislation have been unsuccessful."90 Both of
these points hold little weight in relation to the currently proposed EFCA.
8 H.R. 1409.86id.
87 Sherk, supra note 82.
8 H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Rel. Bd., 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970).
89 Nat'l Labor Rel. Bd. v. Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 101 (1937).
9 AMERICAN RIGHTS AT WORK, supra note 77, at 8.
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First, the EFCA is not limited to private sector businesses that
affect the national interest or even situations that may affect the national
interest. It will apply to all private businesses above the low thresholds that
determine which small businesses are exempt. History shows us that the
President and Congress often have great power in matters that affect the
national interest, but the courts are reluctant to let congress use these
powers when they are not necessary.9 I In this regard, section (3) of the
EFCA is unconstitutionally over broad. It will provide for binding interest
arbitration in all situations, even if there is no national interest in the issue.92
A strike in a clothing manufacturing plant in rural Iowa is not likely to
affect the national interest in a manner sufficient for congress to be able to
intervene. However, if the EFCA passes, they will not only be able to
intervene, they must intervene and create a first contract between the
parties.
Second, the claim that judicial challenges to this type of legislation
have been unsuccessful is unfounded. The statement referenced in the
American Rights at Work report related to the Railway Labor Act and its
relation to private airline businesses. The airline and rail industries are
closely connected to the national interest because the movement of products
and people has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. For this reason,
congress has more leeway to control this type of activity, as seen in the
"commerce clause" Supreme Court cases. In addition, the Railway Labor
Act does not impose the same type of binding interest arbitration on private
employees that section (3) of the EFCA will.94 As mentioned above, the
ARAWReports/arawthefactsbehindefca sh.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2010);
ANGIE WELBORN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT:
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES AND CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO
INTERVENE (2002).
91U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Article one, section eight enumerates the powers of
Congress. The section provides examples of Congressional power during wartime.
The courts have commonly allowed Congress to exercise control over the labor
industry when a national interest was at stake, e.g. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
92 Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2010).
93 Welborn, supra note 90.
94 Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West 2010). The pertinent language of
this provision reads:
When, in the judgment of the National Mediation Board, it shall
be necessary to have a permanent national board of adjustment in
order to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of disputes
between said carriers by air, or any of them, and its or their
employees, growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation
or application of agreements between said carriers by air or any of
them, and any class or classes of its or their employees, covering
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, the National Mediation
Board is empowered and directed, by its order duly made,
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Railway Labor Act provides for a mediation period and a possible referral
to a binding arbitrator, however the private airline employees retain their
right to strike, it is just limited.95 The union may implement a strike if
negotiations have failed and they have exhausted all remedies available
under the statute, including waiting for the thirty day cooling off period to
expire before striking. This law differs from section (3) of the EFCA in a
number of ways, and its purpose is to protect the national interest by
discouraging strikes, and in the event that they do occur, giving the
employer enough time to prepare for this strike without allowing it to affect
the national interest or interstate commerce. The proponents are comparing
apples to oranges, and trying to fool the blind.
D. Claim Four: The EFCA Will Lead to More Voluntary Collective
Bargaining Agreements: Arbitration is More of a Threat than
Anything Else
People in favor of the EFCA continue to put forth three reasons
why section (3) will be more of a threat, meant to encourage collective
bargaining, than a way for the government to end labor disputes and force
parties into a contract. First, they say that the public sector examples show
that the vast majority of contracts are resolved without using interest
arbitration.9 7 Second, they claim that the Act does not favor the union over
the employer, and therefore there is no reason for the union to stall
negotiations in order to force the interest arbitration procedure to start
published, and served, to direct the said carriers by air and such
labor organizations of their employees, national in scope, as have
been or may be recognized in accordance with the provisions of
this chapter, to select and designate four representatives who shall
constitute a board which shall be known as the "National Air
Transport Adjustment Board." Two members of said National Air
Transport Adjustment Board shall be selected by said carriers by
air and two members by the said labor organizations of the
employees, within thirty days after the date of the order of the
National Mediation Board, in the manner and by the procedure
prescribed by section 153 of this title for the selection and
designation of members of the National Railroad Adjustment
Board. The National Air Transport Adjustment Board shall meet
within forty days after the date of the order of the National
Mediation Board directing the selection and designation of its
members and shall organize and adopt rules for conducting its
proceedings, in the manner prescribed in section 153 of this title.
Id.
9s Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West 2010).
96 d
97 AMERICAN RIGHTS AT WORK, supra note 77, at 7.
198 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW Vol. 5: 1
JOURNAL
because the contract terms that result from arbitration tend to be similar to
those reached through collective bargaining in the public sector.98 Finally,
proponents claim that the process will take less time than traditional
bargaining, and that any delays caused by this process will be negated by
the incentives to bargain that it creates.99
Once again, all of these rationales focus on public sector examples,
and fail to take the absence of striking as a viable option into account.
While the public sector examples can provide us with examples about how
long the process will take, or how the organization will work, it is not a
good indicator of how often parties chose to avoid arbitration by agreeing to
a labor contract. It is not a good indicator because, in the public sector, the
parties do not have economic self-help measures at their disposal. This
means that public sector employees may decide that agreeing to terms with
the employer prior to arbitration is the lesser of two evils because they have
no other options. In the private sector, the union could organize a strike to
push their position, without having to make a quick decision because the
deadline for interest arbitration looms over them.
Another major issue with this justification is that the time limits of
the proposed section (3) of the EFCA do not allow the parties enough time
to give collective bargaining a fair shot. Because either party may request
interest arbitration after ninety days of negotiations, the Act does not give
the parties enough time to reach a voluntarily settlement. 00 It is much
easier for one of the parties to bargain to impasse, hoping that the arbitrator
will come down in their favor. Ultimately, the threat of arbitration is much
more than an idle threat, as proponents of the Act claim.'o' Instead of
encouraging parties to settle, the parties are able to see the "light at the end
of the tunnel," the interest arbitration, and hold out until the arbitration
forces a contract. Unions are able then able to submit the matter for
mediation and ultimately interest arbitration at this point, without a vote
from the workers who will actually be locked into this two-year labor
contract.
V. THE SOLUTION: POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS TO "FIX" THE ACT
A. Government Provided Mediator for Non-Binding Session
As many people are aware, there is an important distinction
between binding interest arbitration as provided for in section (3) of the
EFCA, which has the power to create and enforce agreements without
either party's consent, and a non-binding mediation process. If it were the
98 id.
9 Id. at 9.
" H.R. 1409.
1t AMERICAN RIGHTS AT WORK, supra note 77, at 9.
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government's true intent to facilitate fair deals between employers and
employees and to lessen the effect of work stoppages and other labor
related negotiation techniques, then it would be much better off providing
unions and employers with a cost-free mediation service to help facilitate
an initial agreement within a reasonable period. The FMCS, which would
continue to assist negotiators as it does today, though with no binding
power, could still oversee this method.
In fact, the FMCS, which was established by what is regarded as
the most influential labor legislation in U.S. History, the Taft-Hartley
Act,102 was created specifically to do just what is mentioned above. 103 The
FMCS regulations specify that the FMCS has no power to: "(1) compel
parties to appear before an arbitrator; (2) enforce an agreement to arbitrate;
(3) compel parties to arbitrate any issue; (4) influence, alter, or set aside
decisions of arbitrators on the roster; or (5) compel, deny, or modify
payment of compensation to an arbitrator."'0 Enacting the EFCA as
written would be a complete overhaul to this system that would go against
the principles established by the Taft-Hartley Act and would be in direct
contrast to the regulations promulgated by the FMCS itself.'0o There is no
reason to do this and create a binding arbitration process, when mediation
services combined with other incentives and programs listed below would
have a more positive effect on getting employers and employees to reach
their first agreement in a fair and timely manner.
B. Use Financial Incentives to Entice Parties to Reach Initial
Agreement Quickly
Rather than forcing parties to enter into agreements that have the
potential to be detrimental to both parties and could even lead a company
into bankruptcy, the government should amend section (3) of the EFCA to
allow for tax breaks and other financial incentives to facilitate a quicker
agreement between employers and employees. The proposed EFCA
arbitration provision will prove costly to taxpayers, as described above, by
requiring government intervention in the collective bargaining process and
causing delays in the time it takes to reach an agreement. Taking a hands-
off approach, while still providing an opportunity for low or no-cost
mediation assistance, could complement an incentives program very well.
This could lead to agreements between both parties, without governmental
interference, in a shorter period and thus avoid work stoppages that are
costly to the national economy. This solution would help achieve the
" 29 U.S.C.A. § 172 (West 2010).
103 Vernuccio, supra note 10, at 4.
" 29 C.F.R. § 1404.4(d) (2010).
os Vemuccio, supra note 10, at 4-5.
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policy goals underlying the EFCA, while not violating the traditional
principals of freedom to contract.
C. Allow the Courts to Punish Employers and Employees for "Bad
Faith " Bargaining Under the Current System
Not all of the principles behind the interest arbitration provision of
the EFCA are bad. However, the proposed method of implementation is far
too broad. Only thirty-two percent of unions fail to reach a first contract
within one year.io0 Most of these failed negotiations, according to labor
advocates, are due to bad faith efforts by one party, which is a violation of
the NLRA as it currently stands. 07 Subjecting both employers and unions
alike to the possibility of compulsory interest arbitration after a ninety-day
period provides perverse incentives to wait out the ninety-day period
instead of giving a good faith effort in the traditional collective bargaining
context. There are a number of alternatives to this overly broad EFCA
approach discussed throughout this section. Another very feasible
alternative would be to amend the NLRA to allow punishment for bad-faith
negotiations in collective bargaining, and override the H.K Porter decision
by the Supreme Court.'08 Under the Court's current interpretation of the
NLRA, Congress does not have the power to compel parties to enter into a
contract.' 09 Here, the court said:
One of those fundamental policies is freedom to contract.
While the parties' freedom of contract is not absolute under the
Act [NLRA], allowing the Board to compel agreements when
the parties themselves are unable to agree would violate the
fundamental premise on which the Act is based - private
bargaining under governmental supervision of the procedure
alone, without any official compulsion over the actual terms of
the contract.1W
The NLRB took this one-step further in Ex-Cell-O, and said that the NLRA
even prohibits the implementation or use of "make-whole" provisions."'
If Congress were to amend the Act to allow punishment in the
small number of cases where bad faith bargaining is to blame; it would
eliminate the need for forced arbitration. The proposed Act negatively
affects parties who negotiate in good faith and are successful in
negotiations a majority of the time, but cannot reach agreement in this
106 Broderdorf, supra note 19, at 325.
07 Id. at 331.
sId. at 327.
' H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Rel. Bd., 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970).
110 Id.
'Ex-Cell-O Corp. & Int'l UAW, 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 108 (1970).
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particular instance. Because only thirty-two percent of unions fail to reach
an agreement within a year under the traditional method, the EFCA section
(3) is analogous to punishing a room full of ten people to make sure the
three guilty parties are punished.
D. Implementation ofBaseball's Last Shot Arbitration
Major League Baseball (MLB) uses a system of binding arbitration
dubbed "final offer arbitration."1 l2  While the MLB does not use this
method for collective bargaining with the players union, the Major League
Baseball Players Association, it does use it for individual salary arbitration
with players. 13 This is more analogous to private sector binding arbitration
because the individual teams are privately owned and the players are their
employees.114 In this system, when the two parties cannot agree on a
contract after negotiations break down, each party is required to submit
their final offer."' At this time, the arbitrator is required to select the more
reasonable of the two submitted offers." 6
This system works well because it takes away the damaging
incentives often seen in situations where binding arbitration is used.
Binding arbitration has a "chilling effect""17 on parties' incentive to bargain
in good faith because it gives the opposing parties an incentive to make
extreme demands in the hope that the arbitrator will try to split the
difference between the proposals in their favor." 8 The MLB final offer
system, on the other hand, eliminates this incentive because the parties
understand that if their final offer is too extreme, the arbitrator will most
likely select the other party's offer. In fact, this final offer system provides
an incentive for the parties to reach an agreement as close to the middle
ground as possible, in order to protect themselves in the event that they lose
in the arbitration.
112 William B. Gould IV, New Labor Law Reform Variations on an Old Theme: Is
the Employee Free Choice Act the Answer?, 70 LA. L. REv. 1, 24 (2009).
." SPENCER B. GORDON, FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION IN THE NEW ERA OF MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL (2006), http://works.bepress.com/spencergordon/1.
114 All thirty MLB teams are privately owned, unlike in the NFL where the Green
Bay Packers are a publicly owned team.
1s See Gordon, supra note 113.
116 id.
" Elissa M. Meth, Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution in
Domestic and International Disputes, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 383, 387 (1999).
The chilling effect generally says that the availability of binding arbitration as a
form of dispute resolution decreases the parties willingness to negotiate in good
faith.
'18 Gould, supra note 112, at 24.
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William B. Gould IV has suggested implementing this style of
arbitration into the EFCA instead of the currently proposed interest
arbitration.119 There are issues with this proposed solution, however, and
Gould's article only involves one issue as opposed to the multitude of
issues involved in traditional collective bargaining. While the final offer
arbitration may facilitate good faith bargaining, it still provides an incentive
for parties to hold out and wait for the arbitrator to impose an agreement.
This undermines the basic principles of freedom to contract, as the parties
are not voluntarily agreeing to this arbitration method.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Employee Free Choice Act is likely to pass through the
legislative branch and the President will sign it into action in the near
future.12 0  This legislation will have a profound effect on all business
owners and workers, especially entrepreneurs or those working for small
startup companies. The EFCA will have a greater effect on these people
because the arbitration provision of section (3) applies only to parties
negotiating initial agreements. If an entrepreneur intends to start a
company that will utilize unionized labor, he or she will have to pay
particular attention to the EFCA when negotiating with unions for the first
time. Section (3) of the EFCA places an unfair burden on the parties during
initial collective bargaining and creates a system where a disinterested or
self-interested third party has the power to bind both the union and the
employer for a two-year period.
The passage of the bill, as currently proposed, would go against the
fundamental concepts of capitalism and the free-market that are the
foundation of the United States economy. It is important to make some
changes before the EFCA, the largest amendment to labor law in the
country since the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, is enacted. The
EFCA should not contain a compulsory arbitration provision. There is no
reason to place an unaccountable third party arbitrator, designated by the
government, in a position where he or she can impose a binding multi-year
contract upon two parties, neither of whom has agreed to the terms.
u9 Id.
120 The House bill passed the full House in the 110th Session of Congress with a
vote of 241 to 185. However, the Senate did not have the requisite votes to invoke
cloture. Id. The bill was introduced in the 11Ith Congress on March 10, 2009 and
referred to the subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions. At the
time of writing, Republican Senator Scott Brown was recently elected in
Massachusetts, taking away the supermajority from the Democratic Congress,
allowing for a possible filibuster to delay the Act's passage. H.R. 1409. However,
with a President in office who supports the bill and the majority of both the House
and Senate in favor of passage, the bill seems as though it will inevitably become
law.
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Proponents of the process continually praise its effectiveness and
efficiency, but we have seen how efficient this type of system is in reality.
In Michigan, compulsory arbitration routinely takes over seven times the
estimated amount of time quoted in the legislation. We should not sacrifice
the fundamental concepts of our economy for supposed efficiency.
Furthermore, when there is no proven gain in efficiency, we should not
even consider taking the right to bargain for a contract out of the hands of
the employers and employees whom it will affect.
Congress must do something to protect the freedom to contract in
the American private sector. While there is no surefire solution, a
combination of the proposed amendments and changes to the EFCA would
be a good starting point. The government needs to protect citizens' contract
rights and promote small business entrepreneurs by encouraging voluntary
agreements and providing for punishment when parties break the law by
bargaining without good faith. Section (3) of the EFCA takes all power out
of the involved parties' hands and entrusts their livelihood to the
government. This is not the proper solution to the collective bargaining
problem in America. The parties need to resolve these issues amongst
themselves, with little government interference, in order to foster a positive
working environment that will lead to a productive relationship between the
parties, and hopefully a good future relationship.
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APPENDIX I - FULL TEXT OF PROPOSED EFCA As INTRODUCED
A BILL
To amend the National Labor Relations Act to establish an efficient system
to enable employees to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to provide
for mandatory injunctions for unfair labor practices during organizing
efforts, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House ofRepresentatives of the United
States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Employee Free Choice Act of 2009'.
SEC. 2. STREAMLINING UNION CERTIFICATION.
(a) IN GENERAL- Section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (29
U.S.C. 159(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
'(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, whenever a
petition shall have been filed by an employee or group of employees or
any individual or labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that a
majority of employees in a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining wish to be represented by an individual or labor
organization for such purposes, the Board shall investigate the petition.
If the Board finds that a majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for bargaining has signed valid authorizations designating the
individual or labor organization specified in the petition as their
bargaining representative and that no other individual or labor
organization is currently certified or recognized as the exclusive
representative of any of the employees in the unit, the Board shall not
direct an election but shall certify the individual or labor organization
as the representative described in subsection (a).
(7) The Board shall develop guidelines and procedures for the
designation by employees of a bargaining representative in the manner
described in paragraph (6). Such guidelines and procedures shall
include--
(A) model collective bargaining authorization language that
may be used for purposes of making the designations described
in paragraph (6); and
(B) procedures to be used by the Board to establish the validity
of signed authorizations designating bargaining representatives.
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(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS-
(1) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD- Section 3(b)
of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 153(b)) is
amended, in the second sentence--
(A) by striking 'and to' and inserting 'to'; and
(B) by striking 'and certify the results thereof,' and
inserting', and to issue certifications as provided for in
that section,'.
(2) UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES- Section 8(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 158(b)) is amended--
(A) in paragraph (7)(B) by striking, 'or' and inserting
'or a petition has been filed under section 9(c)(6), or';
and
(B) in paragraph (7)(C) by striking 'when such a
petition has been filed' and inserting 'when such a
petition other than a petition under section 9(c)(6) has
been filed'.
SEC 3. FACILITATING INITIAL COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS.
Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 158) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
'(h) Whenever collective bargaining is for the purpose of establishing
an initial agreement following certification or recognition, the
provisions of subsection (d) shall be modified as follows:
(1) Not later than 10 days after receiving a written request for
collective bargaining from an individual or labor organization
that has been newly organized or certified as a representative as
defined in section 9(a), or within such further period as the
parties agree upon, the parties shall meet and commence to
bargain collectively and shall make every reasonable effort to
conclude and sign a collective bargaining agreement.
(2) If after the expiration of the 90-day period beginning on the
date on which bargaining is commenced, or such additional
period as the parties may agree upon, the parties have failed to
reach an agreement, either party may notify the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service of the existence of a
dispute and request mediation. Whenever such a request is
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received, it shall be the duty of the Service promptly to put
itself in communication with the parties and to use its best
efforts, by mediation and conciliation, to bring them to
agreement.
(3) If after the expiration of the 30-day period beginning on the
date on which the request for mediation is made under
paragraph (2), or such additional period as the parties may
agree upon, the Service is not able to bring the parties to
agreement by conciliation, the Service shall refer the dispute to
an arbitration board established in accordance with such
regulations as may be prescribed by the Service. The arbitration
panel shall render a decision settling the dispute and such
decision shall be binding upon the parties for a period of 2
years, unless amended during such period by written consent of
the parties.'.
SEC. 4. STRENGTHENING ENFORCEMENT
(a) INJUNCTIONS AGAINST UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES DURING
ORGANIZING DRIVES-
(1) IN GENERAL- Section 10(1) of the National Labor
Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 160(1)) is amended--
(A) in the second sentence, by striking 'If, after such'
and inserting the following:
'(2) If, after such'; and
(B) by striking the first sentence and inserting the
following:
'(1) Whenever it is charged--
'(A) that any employer--
'(i) discharged or otherwise discriminated against an
employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of section 8;
'(ii) threatened to discharge or to otherwise
discriminate against an employee in violation of
subsection (a)(1) of section 8; or
'(iii) engaged in any other unfair labor practice within
the meaning of subsection (a)(1) that significantly
interferes with, restrains, or coerces employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7;
while employees of that employer were seeking representation
by a labor organization or during the period after a labor
2010 The Employee Free Choice Act: The Effect of 207
Compulsory Interest Arbitration on Entrepreneurs
organization was recognized as a representative defined in
section 9(a) until the first collective bargaining contract is
entered into between the employer and the representative; or
'(B) that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice
within the meaning of subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of section
8(b)(4), section 8(e), or section 8(b)(7);
the preliminary investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith
and given priority over all other cases except cases of like character in
the office where it is filed or to which it is referred.'.
(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT- Section 10(m) of the
National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 160(m)) is amended
by inserting 'under circumstances not subject to section 10(1)'
after 'section 8'.
(b) REMEDIES FOR VIOLATIONS-
(1) BACKPAY- Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations
Act (29 U.S.C. 160(c)) is amended by striking 'And provided
further,' and inserting 'Provided further, That if the Board finds
that an employer has discriminated against an employee in
violation of subsection (a)(3) of section 8 while employees of
the employer were seeking representation by a labor
organization, or during the period after a labor organization
was recognized as a representative defined in subsection (a) of
section 9 until the first collective bargaining contract was
entered into between the employer and the representative, the
Board in such order shall award the employee back pay and, in
addition, 2 times that amount as liquidated damages: Provided
further,'.
(2) CIVIL PENALTIES- Section 12 of the National Labor
Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 162) is amended--
(A) by striking 'Any' and inserting '(a) Any'; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
(b) Any employer who willfully or repeatedly commits any unfair labor
practice within the meaning of subsections (a)(1) or (a)(3) of section 8
while employees of the employer are seeking representation by a labor
organization or during the period after a labor organization has been
recognized as a representative defined in subsection (a) of section 9
until the first collective bargaining contract is entered into between the
employer and the representative shall, in addition to any make-whole
remedy ordered, be subject to a civil penalty of not to exceed $20,000
for each violation. In determining the amount of any penalty under this
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section, the Board shall consider the gravity of the unfair labor practice
and the impact of the unfair labor practice on the charging party, on
other persons seeking to exercise rights guaranteed by this Act, or on
the public interest.'.
